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Abstract
We consider the complexity of finding a correlated equilibrium of
an n-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries
on players’ payoffs at pure strategy profiles. Randomized regret-based
dynamics are known to yield an approximate correlated equilibrium
efficiently, namely, in time that is polynomial in the number of play-
ers n. Here we show that both randomization and approximation
are necessary: no efficient deterministic algorithm can reach even an
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approximate correlated equilibrium, and no efficient randomized al-
gorithm can reach an exact correlated equilibrium. The results are
obtained by bounding from below the number of payoff queries that
are needed.
JEL Classification codes: C8, C7
1 Introduction
The computational complexity of various notions of equilibrium in games is
of interest in many different models of computation. In the present paper
we focus on the important concept of correlated equilibrium, introduced by
Aumann (1974). Perhaps the most striking positive result in this vein is
the surprising power of “regret-based” algorithms in finding (approximate)
correlated equilibria. These algorithms are obtained from a large family
of natural dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in any game, by
emulating the computations carried out by the players in the game; for these
dynamics, see, e.g., Foster and Vohra (1997), Hart and Mas-Colell (2000,
2001), Blum and Mansour (2007), and also the books of Cesa-Bianchi and
Lugosi (2006) and Hart and Mas-Colell (2013). Some of these algorithms
have been shown to converge efficiently (i.e., “quickly”; see Cesa-Bianchi
and Lugosi 2003, 2006 and the Remark at the end of the Introduction). This
is in contrast to the fact that there is no natural dynamic converging to Nash
equilibria (Hart and Mas-Colell 2003, 2006; 2013) and, in fact, no efficient
algorithm is believed to exist either (see Nisan et al. 2007 [Chapter 2]).
Looking at these dynamics from a strictly computational point of view,
they yield algorithms that take the payoff (or utility) functions (u1, ..., un) of
n players as input, and produce an (approximate) correlated equilibrium as
output. Assuming that each player has m pure strategies, the input size is
n ·mn, and yet these algorithms run in time that is polynomial in n and1 m—
which is sub-linear (even poly-logarithmic) in the input size. Even though the
output size mn (a probability for each n-tuple of strategies) is similar to the
input size, these algorithms nevertheless produce an output whose support is
1As well as in 1/ε, the inverse of the approximation parameter.
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also small: polynomial in n and m. These regret-based algorithms need only
“black box” access to the payoff functions, namely, the possibility of making
a sequence of queries ui(s1, ..., sn) for pure strategy profiles (s1, ..., sn).
However, the regret-based algorithms have two undesirable aspects: first,
they are randomized, and second, they produce only an approximate equi-
librium.2 The present paper asks whether these shortcomings can be fixed.
While for many problems with sub-linear algorithms it is clear that both
randomization and approximation are required, this is not the case here.
Usually, the necessity of randomized approximation is already implied by
the verification of the result itself, also known as “certificate complexity” or
“non-deterministic complexity.”3 However, correlated equilibria can be veri-
fied in time that is polynomial in the size of their support, which itself can be
polynomial in n and m, and so the certificate (non-deterministic) complexity
of correlated equilibrium is small.4
Another indication that exact or deterministic algorithms may be possible
comes from the known linear programming (LP) based algorithms for cor-
related equilibria (Papadimitriou and Roughgarden 2008, Jiang and Leyton-
Brown 2011) that produce, in time that is polynomial inm and n, a correlated
equilibrium exactly and deterministically. However, this is obtained in the
stronger model where the algorithm may query the payoff black boxes also
at profiles of mixed strategies.5 We note that an even stronger query model
2It will follow from our results below that running these algorithms with high enough
precision—so that rounding up an approximate equilibrium yields an exact equilibrium—
would not help, as an exponentially high precision would be required.
3Let us look, as an example, at the prototypical sub-linear algorithm of statistical
sampling. For input x ∈ {0, 1}n, the task is to compute—perhaps approximately—the
fraction of 1’s in the input, i.e.,
∑
i
xi/n. A randomized approximation algorithm samples
O(ε−2) entries and gets, with high probability, an ε-approximation. In this case it is easy
to see that randomization and approximation are both crucial since, even if the answer
were given to the algorithm—say, exactly half of the input bits are 1—verifying that this
is so would require querying essentially all inputs, whether this be done deterministically
(even approximately) or exactly (even randomly).
4To verify that a distribution with support of size k is a correlated equilibrium calls
for checking at most n ·m · (m− 1) linear inequalities, and these require at most n ·m · k
payoff queries.
5For example, the single mixed query of what is player 1’s expected payoff when each
player plays the uniform mixed strategy (i.e., each pure strategy has the same probability
of 1/m) requires mn pure queries.
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appears in the “communication complexity” setup, where any function of the
payoff matrices may be queried, e.g., Hart and Mansour (2010).
In recent work, Babichenko and Barman (2013) showed that every de-
terministic algorithm that finds an exact correlated equilibrium requires a
number of pure queries that is exponential in the number of players n. This
raises the question of whether the success of the regret-based algorithms is
due to the power of randomization (which is known to be critical for achiev-
ing low regret), or to the relaxation that allows approximate equilibria rather
than exact ones.
In the present paper we show that it is actually both of these, even when
we limit ourselves to bi-strategy games6 (i.e., m = 2). The following lower
bounds apply in the query model (or “decision tree model”), which makes no
assumptions on the algorithm (in particular not restricting its computational
power) beyond the fact that it has black-box access to the payoff functions,
which provide the values ui(s1, ..., sn) for an adaptively chosen sequence of
pure strategy profiles7 (s1, ..., sn) and players i. In particular, this model
abstracts away from issues having to do with the way that the input is
accessed.8
Our results are:9
Theorem A. Every deterministic algorithm that finds a 1/2-approximate
correlated equilibrium in every n-person bi-strategy game with payoffs in
{0, 1} requires 2Ω(n) queries in the worst case.
(Of course, this holds a fortiori for an ε-approximate correlated equilibrium
6For bi-strategy games coarse correlated equilibria (also known as “Hannan equilibria”)
are equivalent to correlated equilibria, and so the lower bounds obtained here apply also
to the easier problem of finding coarse correlated equilibria.
7Since we are proving lower bounds, the strong (perhaps unrealistic) model only
strengthens our results. We should note that all the regret-based algorithms mentioned
above are actually effective and not only do they make few queries but also the rest of the
computation requires only polynomial time.
8Input queries presume “random access memory”; without it, all algorithms become at
least linear in the input size, and thus exponential in n.
9We use the standard notations: f(n) = O(g(n)) when there is c > 0 such that
f(n) ≤ cg(n) for all n, and f(n) = Ω(g(n)) when there is c > 0 such that f(n) ≥ cg(n)
for all n. Also, f(n) = o(g(n)) if f(n)/g(n)→ 0 as n→∞.
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for any 0 < ε ≤ 1/2.)
Theorem B. Every algorithm (randomized or deterministic) that finds an
exact correlated equilibrium in every n-person bi-strategy game with payoffs
specified as b-bit integers with b = Ω(n) incurs an 2Ω(n) expected cost in the
worst case.
In Theorem B the “cost” includes the number of queries together with the
size of the support of the output produced; see Section 2 (d) for a discussion
of this issue. We do not know whether the result continues to hold for smaller
payoffs, such as payoffs with b = o(n) bits, or payoffs in {0, 1} (i.e., b = 1);
see Section 2 (e).
The following table summarizes the results on the number of queries—we
refer to these as “query complexity bounds”:10
Algorithm
Randomized Deterministic
Approximate Corr Eq
O (n logn)
(regret-based)
2Ω(n)
(Theorem A)
Exact Corr Eq
2Ω(n)
(Theorem B)
2Ω(n)
(B&B 2013)
Remark: Regret-based randomized algorithms for computing ap-
proximate correlated equilibria. Assume that each player has at most
m pure strategies. In Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2003; 2006, Remark 7.6
in Section 7.4) it is shown that by running a regret-based procedure one
finds, with probability at least 1/2, an ε-correlated equilibrium in at most
10“Approximate Corr Eq” stands for ε-approximate correlated equilibrium for fixed
(small enough) ε > 0; the number of strategies m is also fixed (m = 2); and the “regret-
based” algorithms are discussed in the Remark immediately below.
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T = 16 ln(2nm)/ε2 steps. Because each player makes no more than m pay-
off queries at each step, the total number of queries is ≤ nmT. After these
T steps one checks whether the regrets are all ≤ ε (no further queries are
needed here, as the regrets are computed all along) and, if they are not, one
starts the procedure afresh. Because the probability of success is at least 1/2,
the expected number of repetitions is 2, and so the expected total number of
queries is a most 2nmT = 32nm ln(2nm)/ε2, which is O(n logn) for fixed m
and ε > 0.
2 Extensions, Variations, and Open Problems
In this section we discuss a number of relevant issues and open problems.
(a) Query complexity of linear programming
Since computing a correlated equilibrium (CE) in an n-person bi-strategy
game is a linear programming (LP) problem with N = 2n nonnegative un-
knowns (the probabilities of the 2n strategy profiles) and 2n + 1 linear con-
straints (two inequalities per player; in addition, the probabilities sum up to
1), it is appropriate to ask what is the query complexity of general LP prob-
lems of this size. Here, one queries the coefficients appearing in the various
constraints.
Consider a linear programming problem with N nonnegative unknowns
and just 2 constraints:
N∑
j=1
ajxj ≥ 0,
N∑
j=1
xj = 1, x ≥ 0. (1)
Claim 1 Finding a 1/2-approximate solution to problem (1) requires Ω(N)
queries on the coefficients (aj)j=1,...,N in the worst case.
Proof. For every k = 1, ..., N let (1)k be the instance of problem (1) with
ak = 1 and aj = −3 for all j 6= k. For every ε ≥ 0, all the ε-approximate
solutions of (1)k (where the inequality is relaxed to
∑N
j=1 ajxj ≥ −ε) satisfy
xk ≥ (3−ε)/4 and
∑
j 6=k xj ≤ (1+ε)/4, and so for ε ≤ 1/2 we get xk ≥ 5/8 >
6
3/8 ≥ xj for all j 6= k. Therefore the algorithm must find k in {1, ..., N},
which requires Ω(N) queries (whether deterministic or randomized).
The query complexity of an LP of size comparable to the correlated equi-
librium LP is thus Ω(N) = Ω(2n), i.e., exponential in n. This immediately
implies that regret-based algorithms cannot be efficiently translated to gen-
eral LP problems.
(b) Correlated equilibrium as special linear programming
As seen in (a) above, the correlated equilibrium LP must have a special
structure that distinguishes it from general LP problems of similar size. What
is that structure, and how does it help to get the fast (i.e., polynomial in n)
convergence of randomized algorithms to approximate correlated equilibria?
One feature is that the dual LP of the correlated equilibrium LP decom-
poses into n separate LP problems, each one of size m × m (where m is
the number of strategies of each player). This “dual separability” feature
lies at the basis of the existence proof of Hart and Schmeidler (1989), is
used in the algorithm of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden (2008) and Jiang
and Leyton-Brown (2011), and translates to “uncoupledness” in the world
of game dynamics (cf. Hart and Mas-Colell 2003, 2006; 2013). While this
feature distinguishes the correlated equilibrium LP from other LP problems,
it does not explain why it helps in only one of the four cases (see the table
at the end of the Introduction). We thus have:
Open Problem 1. Why does the special structure of the correlated
equilibrium LP help only for randomized algorithms yielding approximate
solutions (where the query complexity is polynomial rather than exponential
in n), and not in any of the other cases (where the query complexity is
exponential in n)?
(c) Support size of approximate correlated equilibria
What is the minimal support size that guarantees existence of an ε-
approximate correlated equilibrium in every n-person bi-strategy game? An
ε-correlated equilibrium is just an ε-optimal strategy in a two-person zero-
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sum game where the opponent has 2n strategies (that correspond to the cor-
related equilibrium inequalities; this zero-sum game is the “auxilliary game”
of Hart and Schmeidler 1989). It follows, by using the result of Lipton and
Young (1994), that there always exist ε-correlated equilibria with uniform
support of size11 k = log n/(2ε2).
As for dynamics, it has been shown (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi 2003, 2006;
see the Remark at the end of the Introduction) that there are regret-based
procedures that in T = 16 lnn(4n)/ε2 steps reach an ε-correlated equilibrium
with probability at least 1/2; moreover, the resulting ε-correlated equilibrium
has uniform support of size T (it gives equal weight of 1/T to each one of
the n-tuples of strategies played in the first T periods). The fact that T
is no more than a constant multiple of k is remarkable, as it implies that
regret-based algorithms yield ε-correlated equilibria with support that is es-
sentially minimal, and so they converge as fast as theoretically possible (up
to a constant factor). In terms of queries, this translates to an upper bound
of O(n logn) queries (because each period every one of the n players makes 2
queries; cf. Goldberg and Roth 2014). For improved bounds on the support
size, see Babichenko, Barman and Peretz (2014).
(d) Cost does not include the size of the support of the output
As we have seen in the Introduction, if the output of the algorithm is
a distribution that has small support (i.e., polynomial in n), then comput-
ing payoffs and verifying the correlated equilibrium inequalities requires only
polynomially many queries. By contrast, if the support is large (i.e., expo-
nential in n) these computations require exponentially many queries (and
that is so even if the representation is succinct, e.g., the product of uniform
mixed strategies). Therefore, our model counts the size of the support as
part of the cost. Interestingly, for Theorem A it turns out that this issue
does not matter (we show this in Section 3.3). But it may well matter for
Theorem B. When the output’s support size is not counted, our proofs show
that the number of queries is 2Ω(n) in the worst case for randomized algo-
11“Uniform support of size k” means that the support consists of k strategy profiles,
not necessarily distinct, each one with weight 1/k (alternatively, the probability weights
are all integer multiples of 1/k).
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rithms that yield correct answers with probability one (see footnote 17 in
Section 5). However, we do not know whether this is so also for randomized
algorithms that are required to yield correct answers with high probability,
and possibly incorrect answers otherwise (we conjecture that it is).
Open Problem 2. Does the result of Theorem B hold also for random-
ized algorithms that yield correct answers with high probability (rather than
with probability one) and for which the size of the support of the output is
not counted?
(e) Exact correlated equilibria for games with small payoffs
Our proof of Theorem B uses, for the worst case, games whose payoffs
range up to 2Ω(n); we do not know whether this requirement is needed, and
so we have:
Open Problem 3. Does the result of Theorem B hold also for payoffs
with b = o(n) bits, and even for payoffs in {0, 1} (i.e., b = 1)?
(f) Query complexity of Nash equilibria
The lower bounds of Theorems A and B apply also to the harder prob-
lem of finding a Nash equilibrium (since every Nash equilibrium is also a
correlated equilibrium), but it is not difficult to see that, in contrast to the
correlated case, for Nash equilibria these bounds are “trivial” as they apply
also to the verification complexity.12 However, if we allow both randomiza-
tion and approximation then the verification complexity of Nash equilibrium
becomes polynomial in n and m (since we can verify that each player i is ap-
proximately best-responding by sampling from the distributions of the other
players). In earlier versions of the present paper we raised the following
question:
12Consider n/2 pairs of players, where each pair of players is playing their own match-
ing pennies game. Clearly the unique Nash equilibrium has every player uniformly ran-
domizing between his two strategies. However, verifying this equilibrium—even allowing
randomized verification—requires looking at essentially all 2n strategy profiles since if an
adversary had changed the utility of a player in any single profile, this would no longer be
an equilibrium. For deterministic verification the adversary could change the utility at all
non-queried profiles so that this would no longer be even an approximate equilibrium.
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Problem 4. Fix ε > 0; does there exist a randomized algorithm, with
only black-box access to the players’ payoff functions, that finds an ε-Nash
equilibrium for every n-player m-strategy game whose running time is poly-
nomial in n and m?
This problem was recently solved by Babichenko (2014) and Chen, Cheng,
and Tang (2015), who proved that the answer is negative: the query com-
plexity of approximate Nash equilibria is exponential.
3 Model and Preliminaries
3.1 Correlated Equilibrium
The setup and notations are standard:
• Game: We will consider games between n players, where each player’s
pure strategy set is {0, 1}. Our players’ payoffs are normalized between
0 and 1, and so a game is given by n payoff functions u1, ..., un, where
for each i we have ui : {0, 1}n → [0, 1].
• Notation: For a (pure) strategy profile v ∈ {0, 1}n, we use two nota-
tions: v(i) ∈ {0, 1}n denotes the result of flipping the i’th bit of v (i.e.,
where player i plays 1− vi and all other j play vj); and vi→b ∈ {0, 1}n
denotes v with the i’th bit set to b (i.e., if vi = b then v
i→b = v, and
otherwise vi→b = v(i).)
• Regret: Let x be a probability distribution over the set of (pure)
strategy profiles, i.e., x : {0, 1}n → [0, 1] with∑v∈{0,1}n x(v) = 1. Take
a player 1 ≤ i ≤ n and a possible strategy b ∈ {0, 1} for i. We say that
the regret of i for not playing b is:
Regreti→b(x) =
∑
v∈{0,1}n
x(v)ui(v
i→b)−
∑
v∈{0,1}n
x(v)ui(v).
• Correlated Equilibrium: For ε ≥ 0, we say that x is an ε-correlated
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equilibrium (ε-CE ) if for all i = 1, ..., n and for all b ∈ {0, 1} we have
Regreti→b(x) ≤ ε. When ε = 0 it is a correlated equilibrium (CE ).
3.2 The Computational Problem
The computational problem is as follows.
The (Approximate) Correlated Equilibrium (CE) problem:
• Input: The payoff functions ui : {0, 1}n → [0, 1] for i = 1, ..., n and
the desired approximation parameter ε ≥ 0.
• Queries: We assume only black-box access to the payoffs: a query is
of the form v ∈ {0, 1}n, and the reply to the query is the n-tuple of
player payoffs: u1(v), ..., un(v).
• Output: An ε-correlated equilibrium of the game. The equilibrium is
given by listing the probability x(v) for every strategy profile v in its
support.
• Cost: The cost on a given input u1, ..., un and ε ≥ 0 is the total
number of queries made plus the size of the support of the equilibrium
produced. The cost of the algorithm is the worst-case cost over all
n-tuples of payoff functions.
3.3 Concise Equilibrium Representations
Notice that in the definition of the CE problem we counted the size of the
support of the produced equilibrium toward the cost of the algorithm. We
could alternatively talk about the weak-CE problem where the algorithm
is allowed to produce an equilibrium with arbitrarily large support whose
size is not counted as part of the cost. Practically, the algorithm could use
some concise representation of the equilibrium, e.g., some mixture of prod-
uct distributions. We show however that this would not make the problem
significantly easier, as any approximate CE algorithm that makes a small
11
number of queries can be converted to one that also produces a CE with
small support.
Lemma 2 Given an algorithm that solves the weak-CE problem with error
ε in T queries, there exists an algorithm that solves the (strong) CE problem
with error O(
√
ε) and cost (including support size) O(T ).
We first bound the probability that a CE algorithm may assign to un-
queried profiles.
Lemma 3 Consider any ε-CE algorithm that on some input (u1, ..., un) queries
a set Q of profiles and outputs an ε-CE x. Denote Q′ = {v|v ∈ Q or v(1) ∈ Q}
and α = maxv∈Q′ u1(v); then x puts probability at most 2(α + ε) outside Q
′,
i.e.,
∑
v 6∈Q′ x(v) ≤ 2(α + ε).
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that this is not the case, and fur-
thermore assume without loss of generality that at least half of this weight is
on v’s with v1 = 0, i.e.,
∑
v 6∈Q′ and v1=0
x(v) > α + ε. Now consider changing
the input payoffs in two different ways without changing the queried profiles.
The first way just assigns u1(v) = 0 for all v 6∈ Q′. In the second way we
put u1(v) = 0 for all v 6∈ Q′ with v1 = 0 and u1(v) = 1 for v 6∈ Q′ with
v1 = 1. Clearly the gap between Regret1→1 for these two cases is exactly∑
v/∈Q′ and v1=0
x(v) > α + ε. However, notice that since α = maxv∈Q′ u1(v),
in the first way, u1(v) is bounded by α for all v and thus |Regret1→1| ≤ α;
in the second way we therefore have Regret1→1 > ε. This contradicts the
correctness of the ε-CE algorithm on the input obtained by the second way
of changing the original input.
We now complete the proof of the computational equivalence between the
two versions of the approximate CE problem.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let us first run the weak-CE algorithm on α-scaled
payoffs u′i(v) = αui(v) to obtain an ε-CE x
′(v) for the u′’s (with α to be
determined below). By scaling back we have that x′ is an (ε/α)-CE for
the original u’s:
∑
v∈{0,1}n x
′(v)(ui(v
i→b) − ui(v)) ≤ ε/α. As in Lemma 3,
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denote Q′ = {v|v ∈ Q or v(1) ∈ Q}, where Q is the set of queries made by
the algorithm. Our output will be x(v) = 0 for v 6∈ Q′ and x(v) = βx′(v)
for v ∈ Q′, where β = 1/∑v∈Q′ x′(v) is the scaling factor ensuring that∑
v∈{0,1}n x(v) = 1. By Lemma 3
∑
v 6∈Q′ x
′(v) ≤ 2(α + ε), and so β ≤
1/(1− 2(α + ε)) and
∑
v∈{0,1}n
x(v)(ui(v
i→b)− ui(v)) = β
∑
v∈Q′
x′(v)(ui(v
i→b)− ui(v))
≤ β
∑
v∈{0,1}n
x′(v)(ui(v
i→b)− ui(v))
+β
∑
v/∈Q′
x′(v)|ui(vi→b)− ui(v)|
≤ 1
1− 2(α + ε)
( ε
α
+ 2(α + ε)
)
Choosing α = O(
√
ε) completes the proof.
4 Deterministic Algorithms for Approximate
Correlated Equilibria
This section proves that deterministic algorithms require exponentially many
queries to compute even an approximate equilibrium. Notice that due to
Lemma 2 the same is also implied for the weak-CE problem that allows
arbitrary concise representations of the output. Our result here is:
Theorem A. Every deterministic algorithm that finds a 1/2-approximate
correlated equilibrium in every n-person bi-strategy game with payoffs in
{0, 1} requires 2Ω(n) queries in the worst case.
4.1 The Approximate Sink Problem
Our lower bound here will be based on analyzing the following combinatorial
problem on the (Boolean) hypercube {0, 1}n.
The “Approximate Sink” (AS) problem:
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• Input: A labeling of the edges of the hypercube by directions; i.e., for
every edge (v, v(i)) we have a weight (or direction) R(v, v(i)) ∈ {−1, 1}
such that R(v, v(i)) = −R(v(i), v). We interpret R(v, v(i)) = 1 as the
edge going from v to v(i), and R(v(i), v) = −1 as the edge going from
v(i) to v.
• Queries: The algorithm queries a vertex v ∈ {0, 1}n and gets the
directions R(v, v(i)) of all edges adjacent to v.
• Output: The algorithm wins when it queries a vertex v with in-degree
no less than n/4, i.e.,13
∑
iR(v, v
(i)) ≤ n/2.
We show that exponentially many queries are needed in order to find such
a vertex. This implies Theorem A due to the following simple reduction:
Lemma 4 If there exists a deterministic algorithm that in every game with
payoffs in {0, 1} finds a 1/2-CE with at most T queries, then the AS problem
can be solved with at most T queries.
Proof. Given an AS instance we build a CE instance with14 R(v, v(i)) =
ui(v
(i)) − ui(v) and run the approximate CE algorithm on it, translating
every query the CE algorithm makes to an AS query. For R(v, v(i)) = 1 we
set ui(v
(i)) = 1 and ui(v) = 0, while for R(v, v
(i)) = −1 we set ui(v(i)) = 0
and ui(v) = 1. Under this mapping, when the CE algorithm makes a query
(u1(v), ..., un(v)) it is immediately translated to the same query v on the
original AS instance, and R(v, v(i)) = 1 means ui(v) = 0 while R(v, v
(i)) =
−1 means ui(v) = 1. When the CE algorithm produces an approximate
equilibrium x, we continue by querying all the profiles in the support of x,
whose number was, by definition, already counted toward the cost of the CE
algorithm.
13
∑
i
R(v, v(i)) is the net outflow through v, i.e., the out-degree O(v) of v minus its
in-degree I(n); because O(v) + I(v) = n, we have I(v) ≥ n/4 iff ∑
i
R(v, v(i)) ≤ n/2.
14Edges are thus pointed in the direction of increasing payoff (i.e., positive regret): from
v to v(i) when ui(v
(i)) > ui(v), and from v
(i) to v when ui(v) > ui(v
(i)).
14
Now take a 1/2-equilibrium output by the CE algorithm. Summing up
the inequalities of the CE we get:
∑
i,bRegreti→b =
∑
v x(v)
∑
i(ui(v
(i)) −
ui(v)) ≤ n/2, which implies that for some v in the support of x we have∑
iR(v, v
(i)) =
∑
i(ui(v
(i))− ui(v)) ≤ n/2, as needed.
4.2 Polite Algorithms
We now prove the lower bound for the AS problem. The core of our argument
is to show that every relevant algorithm for the AS problem (see Lemma 9)
can be transformed into an algorithm of the following form, without signifi-
cantly increasing the number of queries.
Definition 5 We call an algorithm for the AS problem polite if whenever a
vertex v is queried, at least 3n/4 of its neighbors in the hypercube have not
yet been queried.
It is quite easy to show that polite algorithms cannot solve AS.
Lemma 6 No deterministic polite algorithm can solve the AS problem.
Proof. We provide an adversary argument: whenever a vertex is queried,
the adversary answers with all edges that were previously not committed to
pointing out. Since there are at least 3n/4 such edges, the in-degree is at
most n/4, and so this vertex cannot be an answer.
4.3 Closure
To convert an algorithm to a polite form, we need to make sure that vertices
are queried before too many of their neighbors are. We use the following
notion:
Definition 7 For a set V ⊆ {0, 1}n of vertices in the hypercube, we define
its closure V ∗ ⊆ {0, 1}n to be the smallest set containing V such that for
every v 6∈ V ∗ at most n/8 of its neighbors are in V ∗.
15
The closure is well defined and can be obtained by starting with V ∗ = V
and repeatedly adding to V ∗ any vertex v that has more than n/8 of its
neighbors already in V ∗. Clearly the order of additions does not matter
since the number of neighbors a vertex has in V ∗ only increases as other
vertices are added to V ∗. When the process stops every v 6∈ V ∗ has at most
n/8 of its neighbors in V ∗.
The point is that we will not need to continue this process of adding
vertices for a long time.
Lemma 8 If |V | < 2n/8−1 then |V ∗| ≤ 2|V |.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that |V ∗| > 2|V |, and denote by U
the set obtained during the process of building V ∗ after adding exactly |V |
vertices; thus |U | = 2|V |. Let us denote by e(U) the number of directed edges
within U , i.e., e(U) = |{(u, i)|u ∈ U and u(i) ∈ U}|. We provide conflicting
lower and upper bounds for e(U). For the lower bound, notice that every
vertex that we added during the process adds at least n/4 edges to e(U) (n/8
of its own edges as well as the n/8 opposite ones), and so e(U) ≥ |U−V |n/4 =
|V |n/4. For the upper bound we use the edge-isoperimetric inequality on the
hypercube (Hart 1976), which implies that for every subset of the hypercube
e(U) ≤ |U | log2 |U |. Thus we have |V |n/4 ≤ |U | log2 |U | = 2|V |(log2 |V |+1),
and so (1 + log2 |V |) ≥ n/8, contradicting the bound on the size of V .
4.4 A Polite Simulation
We can now provide our general simulation by polite algorithms, which com-
pletes the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 9 Every algorithm that makes at most T = 2n/8−1 queries can be
simulated by a polite algorithm that makes at most 2T queries.
Proof. For t = 1, ..., T denote by qt the t’th query made by the original
algorithm, and let Qt = {q1, ..., qt} be the set of all queries made until time
t. Our polite algorithm will simulate query qt by querying all vertices in
Q∗t , i.e., completing the closure implied by adding qt. Notice that Q
∗
t =
16
(Qt−1 ∪ {qt})∗ = (Q∗t−1 ∪ {qt})∗. The difficulty is that we need to add the
vertices in Q∗t −Q∗t−1 in a way that maintains politeness, i.e., such that each
vertex is added before n/4 of its neighbors are.
To see that this is possible let us look at the vertices in Nt = Q
∗
t −
Q∗t−1. First, the previous lemma implies that |Nt| ≤ |Qt| = t. By the
edge-isoperimetric inequality applied to Nt we have e(Nt) ≤ t log2 t, and
so some vertex v ∈ Nt has at most log2 t < n/8 neighbors in Nt; this will
be the last vertex our polite algorithm will query in this stage. Similarly,
from the remaining elements N ′ = Nt\{v} there is also a vertex v′ with at
most log2(t − 1) < n/8 neighbors in N ′, and this vertex will be asked just
before v. We continue so until we exhaust Nt. Now we claim that this order
maintains politeness: since, by definition, every vertex in Nt has fewer than
n/8 neighbors in Q∗t−1, when we add the fewer than n/8 neighbors from Nt
that appeared before it in the ordering of Nt, we still get fewer than n/4
neighbors preceding it. Finally, notice that the simulating algorithm queries,
by Lemma 8, at most 2T vertices inQ∗T , and so its running time is as required.
5 Randomized Algorithms for Exact Corre-
lated Equilibria
This section provides the lower bound for randomized algorithms. Recall
that randomized algorithms can in fact compute an approximate CE with
polynomially many queries (using regret-based procedures). This section
proves that they cannot compute an exact CE.
First let us formally define a randomized algorithm. A randomized algo-
rithm is just a probability distribution over deterministic algorithms.15 For
every input, this random choice of the algorithm results in the output be-
ing a random variable. We say that a randomized algorithm solves a search
problem (like our problem of finding an equilibrium) if for every input, the
15Which is the same as a “behavioral” algorithm that makes randomizations all along (cf.
Kuhn’s mixed vs. behavioral strategies in games of perfect recall—which our algorithms
clearly have, as we impose no restrictions such as finite automata).
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probability that the output is a correct solution is at least16 1/2. The cost
of a randomized algorithm on a given input is the expected cost made over
the random choice of the algorithm, and the cost of a randomized algorithm
is its cost for the worst-case input. So our theorem for this section is:
Theorem B. Every algorithm (randomized or deterministic) that finds an
exact correlated equilibrium in every n-person bi-strategy game with payoffs
specified as b-bit integers with b = Ω(n) requires a 2Ω(n) expected cost in the
worst case.
This theorem applies even to randomized algorithms that produce a CE
with any non-negligible probability. It also applies to the weak-CE version
of the problem defined in Section 3.3, but only for zero-error algorithms.17
Finally, it can be seen from the proofs below that it also applies to ε-CE, for
ε that is exponentially small in n.
5.1 The Non-Positive Vertex Problem
Similarly to the deterministic case, we here reduce the correlated equilibrium
problem to the following combinatorial problem on the hypercube. It is es-
sentially a weighted version of the Approximate Sink problem, with a stricter
bound on the output quality.
The “Non-Positive Vertex” (NPV) problem:
• Input: A labeling of the directed edges of the hypercube by integers
where the convention is that R(u, v) = −R(v, u).
• Queries: A query is a vertex v in the hypercube. The answer to
this query is the tuple of labels on all adjacent edges: R(v, v(i)) for
i = 1, ..., n.
16With the complementary probability the output may be incorrect (and so this is not
a “zero-error” algorithm).
17This is because Lemma 2 holds also for zero-error randomized algorithms as it can
be applied to each deterministic algorithm in the support. (Our proof does not imply the
extension to the weak-CE case for general randomized algorithms, even though we believe
that the theorem itself does extend.)
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• Output: The algorithm must output a vertex v in the hypercube with
total non-positive weight, i.e.,
∑
iR(v, v
(i)) ≤ 0.
As in Lemma 4, proving a randomized lower bound for the NPV problem
implies a similar bound for the CE problem due to the following reduction.
Lemma 10 The number of queries required for a randomized NPV algorithm
to solve the NPV problem is at most the number of queries required for a
randomized algorithm to solve the CE problem.
Proof. We convert a CE algorithm to an NPV one. Let m = maxu,vR(u, v).
Given an NPV instance we build a CE instance ensuring that ui(v
(i)) −
ui(v) = R(v, v
(i))/m: for positive R(v, v(i)) we set ui(v) = 0 and ui(v
(i)) =
R(v, vi))/m , while for negative R(v, v(i)) we set ui(v) = −R(v, v(i))/m and
ui(v
(i)) = 0. Under this mapping, when the CE algorithm makes a query v
it is immediately translated to the same query v of the NPV black box, and
the answer from the NPV black box directly provides the answer to the CE
query.
Now take an equilibrium x output by the CE algorithm. Summing up
the inequalities of the CE we get:
∑
i,bRegreti→b =
∑
v x(v)
∑
i(ui(v
(i)) −
ui(v)) ≤ 0, which implies that for some v in the support of x we have∑
iR(v, v
(i)) =
∑
i(ui(v
(i)) − ui(v)) ≤ 0, as needed to provide an answer
to the NPV problem.
We continue proving the lower bound for randomized algorithms that
solve the NPV problem by exhibiting a distribution over NPV instances such
that every deterministic algorithm requires exponentially many queries in
order to succeed on a non-negligible fraction of inputs drawn according to
this distribution; we appeal here to the so-called “Yao (1977) Principle,”
an instance of von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem. The lower bound for
randomized CE algorithms follows, thus completing the proof of Theorem B.
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5.2 A Path Construction
We build hard instances of the NPV problem from paths in the hypercube.
Let (v0, v1, ..., vL) be a (not necessarily simple) path in the hypercube; i.e.,
for each 0 ≤ j < L, the vertex vj+1 is obtained from vj by flipping a single
random bit. The NPV instance we build from this path essentially gives
weight −j to the edge (vj−1, vj), with weights added over the possible multiple
times the path goes through a single edge. This way every time the path
passes a vertex v at step j, the incoming edge gets weight −j while the
outgoing edge gets weight j+1, adding one to the total net weight going out
of v. Formally:
Definition 11 Let (v0, v1, ..., vL) be a (not necessarily simple) path in the
hypercube. The path induces the following labeling of the hypercube: R(u, v) =∑
{j|u=vj−1,v=vj}
j −∑{j|u=vj ,v=vj−1} j.
Lemma 12 For each v 6= vL we have
∑
iR(v, v
(i)) = |{j|vj = v}|. For vL
we have
∑
iR(vL, v
(i)
L ) = |{j|vj = vL}| − L.
Proof. Except for the last vertex, vL, whenever the path goes into v at step
j and exits it in step j + 1, the total values of R’s going out of this vertex
increases by 1 (−j incoming and j + 1 outgoing). As for vL, we need to
subtract L due to the fact that the last edge goes in (and there is no edge
that goes out).
This means that if the path covers the whole hypercube then the only
non-positive vertex in it is the end of the path.
We now define a random distribution over paths that cover the whole
hypercube and whose final end point is random. We start with some (fixed)
Hamiltonian path in the hypercube. From that point on we continue with a
random walk of length L = n · 2n/3. Why would it be hard for an algorithm
to find the end of the path? We show that an algorithm must essentially
follow the path query by query. Otherwise it is looking for a needle of length
L = n · 2n/3 that is randomly hidden in a haystack of size 2n. But probing
places that are already known to be in the random part of the path only allows
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the algorithm to advance sequentially over it, thus requiring exponential time
to reach the end.
Lemma 13 Any deterministic algorithm that runs in time T < 2n/3/n is
able to solve the NPV problem on at most a fraction of O(2−n/3) of inputs
drawn according to this distribution.
Since all the information in our path-based instances of the NPV problem
are determined by the path, we can imagine that the queries directly ask for
this path information. Since the only non-positive vertex in these instances is
the end of the path, our algorithm really needs to find it. Not only is this hard
to do, but it is hard even to find any vertex that is near the tail of the path.
This is so since, on the one hand, the tail is a tiny fraction of the hypercube
and so it can’t be found “at random,” and, on the other hand, the only
possible “deliberate” way to find it is to follow the path step by step, which
takes exponential time. The reason that no “shortcuts” are possible when
following the path is that the random walk in the hypercube mixes rapidly,
and so one gets no information about how the path continues beyond the
very near vicinity. To formalize this line of reasoning we introduce a variant
of the problem that explicitly provides the algorithm with any information
that we think it may get a handle on. Specifically, we tell the algorithm
everything about the path except for its tail, and, furthermore, give it an
additional n2 vertices at the beginning of this tail every step. Once this is
given to the algorithm, we are able to show that the algorithm can never
learn anything new.
5.3 The “Hit The Path” (HTP) problem
We formally define the HTP problem.
The “Hit The Path” (HTP) problem:
• Input: A random path (v0, ..., vL) in the hypercube of length L =
n2n/3, starting from a revealed vertex v0.
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• Queries: At each step t = 1, ..., T :
1. The algorithm may query a vertex qt of the hypercube, depend-
ing on the revealed information so far (which we will soon see is
exactly the sequence (v0, ..., v(t−1)n2)).
2. The next n2 vertices of the path, i.e., v(t−1)n2+1, ..., vtn2 , are re-
vealed (independently of the query).
• Output: The algorithm wins at time t if qt is on the non-previously
revealed part of the path, i.e., qt ∈ {vtn2+1, ..., vL}.
Lemma 14 Every algorithm for the HTP problem with at most T queries
wins with probability at most (1 + o(1))n2−2n/3T.
Proof. Fix a (deterministic) algorithm for the HTP problem that makes at
most T queries. If it wins, then for some step 1 ≤ t ≤ T it won (for the
first time) by finding an unrevealed vertex vj for tn
2 < j ≤ L. We bound
this probability (over the random choice of the path) for a fixed t and j,
and then use the union bound to obtain an upper bound on the probability
that the algorithm wins. Now let us look at the t’th query qt made by the
algorithm. If none of the previous queries won, then the only information
the algorithm had when making this query was the revealed part of the
path, i.e., (v0, v1, ..., v(t−1)n2), and so the query is just a function of these:
qt = qt(v0, v1, ..., v(t−1)n2). What is the probability that for some function on
these inputs we have qt(v0, v1, ..., v(t−1)n2) = vj? Note that our construction
of random paths means that vj is obtained by taking a random walk of length
j − (t − 1)n2 ≥ n2 from vertex v(t−1)n2 . Now comes the crucial observation:
as the mixing time of the hypercube is known to be O(n logn) < n2 (cf.
Diaconis et al. 1990), this means that a random walk of length l ≥ n2 ends
at an almost uniformly random vertex of the hypercube. Thus for any fixed
(v0, v1, ..., v(t−1)n2), we have that vj is almost uniformly distributed over the
hypercube and so Pr[qt(v0, v1, ..., v(t−1)n2) = vj] = (1+o(1))2
−n. Multiplying
this quantity by T < 2n/3/n (for all possible values of t) and then by 2n/3n (for
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all possible values of j), we get the required upper bound for the probability
of winning.
Proof of Lemma 13. First, note that Lemma 14 implies in particular
that an HTP-algorithm with T < 2n/3/n queries can win with probability at
most O(2−n/3).
Second, recalling the discussion immediately following the statement of
Lemma 13, suppose that we have an algorithm that succeeds in solving the
NPV problem on a larger fraction of inputs drawn according to this distribu-
tion; we use it to win instances of this HTP problem with at least the same
probability. Whenever the NPV algorithm makes a query to v we make the
same query in the HTP case. If we win, then we are done. Otherwise, we
know that the non-revealed part of the path does not pass through v and
so the reply to the NPV query is completely determined by the revealed
part of the path, which we already have and can use for the reply. If the
NPV algorithm succeeds then it must have found the last vertex on the path
(the only non-positive one), which is on the path and is revealed only after
L/n2 = 2n/3/n > T queries, and so is still unrevealed and thus our HTP
algorithm wins too.
Combining Lemmas 10 and 13 proves Theorem B.
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